Here’s an interesting analysis by Frederick Kagan and Kimberly Kagan of the new coalition strategy in Iraq. The surge now complete, coalition forces have a tactical hand to play unprecidented since their invasion of Iraq in 2003. Kagan and Kagan tell of three lessons informing Gen. Petraeus, and other leaders, drawn from past mistakes:

1.) Political progress itself will not reduce the violence, especially when Iraqi government is too little established to provide stability. Coalition forces, and lots of them, are needed to provide the basis for political stability.

2.) Higher ratios of troops to civilians does provide easier won success in bringing stability, though it is not determinative, considering preparedness and troop reliability. More coalition soldiers, along with more well-trained and reliable Iraqi forces, the total of which is now 350,000 in Iraq, have improved troop/civilian ratios significantly.

3.) After an area has been cleared of insurgents, rapid reduction of coalition forces while turning control over to Iraqi forces should not occur prematurely. All previous operations were hindered because Iraqi forces were not sufficiently capable of maintain security. Coalition forces need to hold their positions and help keep the peace.

4.) Advance forces, moving ahead of major operations, need to be used to establish bases and establish contact with local civilians. Not only does this assist with better tactical planning of the numbers need to clear an area, it is a way of reaching out to local leaders who are potential allies.

5.) Casualities are always highest at the start of clearing operations, despite better troop/civilian ratios and solid preparation. These casualities need to be expected! This spike in casualties is the short term cost of flushing insurgents from their defensive positions, and this spike NEEDS to be explained so that the political will for operations is maintained.

As Kagan and Kagan sum up:

… there is every reason to believe at this stage that the current operation and its likely successor will dramatically reduce the level of violence in Baghdad, and do so in a way that will prove sustainable. That accomplishment in itself will be a major contribution to American security, in that it will entail a major defeat for al Qaeda and its allies, now surging in response to our stepped-up operations. And it will create an unprecedented situation in postwar Iraq: one in which Iraq’s elected government can meet and discuss policies in relative security in a capital returning to normal; in which Sunni and Shia can afford to compromise without fear of an imminent sectarian explosion; and in which Iraqi forces can become increasingly responsible for maintaining the security that they have helped to establish. The current strategy is on track to produce that outcome–which is why it deserves to be given every chance to succeed.