But even those who deny that assertion have failed to explain how a 10-day delay meets the requirement for a more explicit test of confidence at “the earliest opportunity.”

“Experts” have in the past suggested that a government can assume they have the support of the House unless some event occurs to question that support. When such an event does occur, the government is obliged to test the confidence of the House at the earliest opportunity.

Instead, this government seems to acknowledge that the House’s confidence is indeed in question, but as long as they can introduce enough new motions and bills to “buy” a winning formula, they can continue to govern. Imagine if Mr. Clark’s government simply re-wrote their budget when it failed, instead of bowing to convention. Yet Mr. Martin and Mr. Goodale have both publicly acknowledged that their budget does not have the confidence of the House, and that MPs voted last Tuesday “to defeat the government” yet they seem to be trying to find a winning formula to _re-gain_ the confidence of the House.

As far as I am aware, such arrogance is unprecedented in British Parliamentary tradition.

You’re right about Canadian republicanism. In fact, Smith has elucidated all the reasons why it’s only an option in Canada, and why (to his disappointment, it seems) the various legal, political, and cultural characteristics of Canada hinder any kind of republicanism. I’m skeptical about it myself, largely because a res publica requires a populus, which Canada lacks.

As to Canadian republicanism, this is a red herring on two counts. First, it would require unanimous consent to amend the Constitution. Good luck. More importantly, even if you replace the Governor General with a “President”, she would still have to have some variation of the reserve powers in order to prevent the very situation we are witnessing.